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throwing the ball, is different, but not less in degree, than are the mathematical calculations by which the engineer constructs a bridge or determines the course of projectiles.

The experimental psychologist has been greatly handicapped in his tests, especially those directed towards the measurement of general intelligence, by the fact that psychological analysis has not pointed out these different forms of intelligence that are the result of the functioning of different organs in different ways.

The study of functioning, organosis or intelligence from the conscious side only is much like trying to understand the movements of an engine, an electric car, or a printing press by watching the operator. The human mechanism is a million-fold more complex than any of these machines, and the details and success of its functioning are known and controlled by consciousness to as slight an extent as are the detailed mechanisms and working of a great railroad system by its president, and yet there is no more reason to doubt that consciousness influences behavior than there is to doubt the influence of the railroad president.

When the genetic point of view is more fully worked out psychology will be transformed not so much by having its accepted facts invalidated as by having them illuminated, explained, and placed in their proper perspective in relation to other sciences and to the theory of evolution that has so rapidly transformed all of scientific thought.

The above is a *very* brief statement of the point of view reached by the writer in his study of genetic psychology, presented, while some of the details are being worked out, for the criticism of psychologists.

Suggestions are desired, not only as to the point of view, but as to terms. Is it best to extend the meaning of old terms and recognize unconscious as well as conscious intelligence, memory, perception, etc., or is it best to invent new terms that shall imply neither consciousness nor unconsciousness while the facts of behavior are being studied?

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DISCUSSION

THE ABSOLUTE AND THE STRENUOUS LIFE

MR. W. A. BROWN, in the JOURNAL for August 15, approves my pragmatism for allowing that a belief in the absolute may give holidays to the spirit, but takes me to task for the narrow-

ness of this concession, and shows by striking examples how great a power the same belief may have in letting loose the strenuous life.

I have no criticism whatever to make upon his excellent article, but let me explain why 'moral holidays' were the only gift of the absolute which I picked out for emphasis. I was primarily concerned in my lectures with contrasting the belief that the world is still in process of making with the belief that there is an 'eternal' edition of it ready-made and complete. The former, or 'pluralistic' belief, was the one that my pragmatism favored. Both beliefs confirm our strenuous moods. Pluralism actually demands them, since it makes the world's salvation depend upon the energizing of its several parts, among which we are. Monism permits them, for however furious they may be, we can always justify ourselves in advance for indulging them by the thought that they *will have been* expressions of the absolute's perfect life. By escaping from your finite perceptions to the conception of the eternal whole, you can hallow any tendency whatever. Though the absolute *dictates* nothing, it will *sanction* anything and everything after the fact, for whatever is once there will have to be regarded as an integral member of the universe's perfection. Quietism and frenzy thus alike receive the absolute's permit to exist. Those of us who are naturally inert may abide in our resigned passivity; those whose energy is excessive may grow more reckless still. History shows how easily both quietists and fanatics have drawn inspiration from the absolutistic scheme. It suits sick souls and strenuous ones equally well.

One can not say thus of pluralism. Its world is always vulnerable, for some part may go astray; and having no 'eternal' edition of it to draw comfort from, its partisans must always feel to some degree insecure. If, as pluralists, we grant ourselves moral holidays, they can only be provisional breathing-spells, intended to refresh us for the morrow's fight. This forms one permanent inferiority of pluralism from the pragmatic point of view. It has no saving message for incurably sick souls. Absolutism, among its other messages, has that message, and is the only scheme that has it necessarily. That constitutes its chief superiority and is the source of its religious power. That is why, desiring to do it full justice, I valued its aptitude for moral-holiday giving so highly. Its claims in that way are unique, whereas its affinities with strenuousness are less emphatic than those of the pluralistic scheme.

In my last lecture I candidly allowed for this inferiority of pluralism. It lacks the wide indifference that absolutism shows. It is bound to disappoint many sick souls whom absolutism can console. It seems therefore poor tactics for absolutists to make little

of this advantage. The needs of sick souls are surely the most urgent; and believers in the absolute should rather hold it to be a great merit in their philosophy that it can meet them so well.

The pragmatism or pluralism which I defend has to fall back on a certain ultimate hardihood, a certain willingness to live without assurances or guarantees. To minds thus willing to live on possibilities that are not certainties, quietistic religion, sure of salvation *any how*, has a slight flavor of fatty degeneration about it which has caused it to be looked askance on, even in the church. Which side is right here, who can say? Within religion, emotion is apt to be tyrannical; but philosophy must favor the emotion that allies itself best with the whole body and drift of all the truths in sight. I conceive this to be the more strenuous type of emotion; but I have to admit that its inability to let loose quietistic raptures is a serious deficiency in the pluralistic philosophy which I profess.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Theory of Good and Evil. A Treatise on Moral Philosophy. HASTINGS RASHDALL. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1907. 2 Vols. Pp. xx + 312; xv + 464.

The purpose of Dr. Rashdall's 'Theory of Good and Evil' is primarily to provide for the use of undergraduate students of philosophy a systematic discussion, which shall be as free as possible from perplexing 'allusiveness and technicality,' of the chief topics connected with the ethical problem. The author's own theory embodies a frank attempt to present 'a fresh systematic treatment of the main problems of moral philosophy' in the spirit which animated Professors Green and Sidgwick, and a reconstruction of ethical theory which shall profit not only by the criticisms of each of those thinkers upon the other, but also by the 'general progress of philosophy' since the first appearance of their ethical works.

This treatise, though concerned with the investigation of profound questions, is singularly successful in its avoidance of all ponderosity and pedantry. Written in a pleasing style, it is readable throughout. The problems discussed are clearly presented, the line of argument is always developed with logical care and dialectical skill, the discussions of even the most abstract questions are uniformly lucid and illuminating. Much of the suggestive power of the work is derived from the wealth of pertinent illustration, upon his abundant store of which the author draws freely. Particularly noteworthy is the careful analysis of problems under investigation and the comprehensive marshaling of opposing and conflicting views. Of the merits and demerits of inharmonious views there is